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SECURITY INFORMATION

Air

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Chief of Station, Frankfurt  
Attn: FCB/C  
Chief, EE

10 April 1952

**KIBITZ Progress Report**

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1. We appreciate having reference memorandum, which adds to our understanding of KIBITZ 15 and his network. You touched on the basic problem, of course, in Para. 1 when you stated that it is most difficult for the desk officer, at long range, to gain the kind of understanding of an agent which one would gain in personal dealings with him. As a matter of fact, most of our concern with respect to KIBITZ 15 and his outfit has long since disappeared as a result of further dispatches from the field and conversations with [ ] [ ]'s evaluation of 15 also helps to fill out the picture of an extremely able agent who has become virtually an additional case officer for us.

2. The problem discussed in Para. 3 (b) is being covered in a separate pouch.

3. We are only too well aware that the problem of deployment and targets, discussed in your Para. 3 (c), has been a difficult one both from your standpoint and ours. We feel, however, that [ ] [ ] solved at least some of the target problems during his TDY here and we suggest that you ask him to make available to you the materials which he compiled. What he did, briefly, was to make up a tentative target list based on the IPC list of immediate targets and the ZIPPER list. Presumably, his final list will be sent here and submitted to the IPC for discussion and coordination.

4. With respect to Para. 3 (d) it is our feeling - and doubtless yours since you expressed it first - that the vicissitudes encountered in attempting to keep an agent interested and stimulated are largely psychological factors met in handling any agent. The difference is, of course, that thus far the staybehind agents have not possessed much more in the way of motivation than a patriotic desire to aid the German and Allied cause at an undetermined later

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐  
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒  
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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date. In other words, monetary and other similar material aids have been lacking. It is hoped that [ ]'s suggestions regarding financial compensation will help to alleviate this problem in the future.

5. One item not covered by reference memorandum is the size of the individual staybehind teams. There has been a good deal of discussion here concerning this matter. The feeling here is that two-man teams are the most suitable from the standpoint of both operational efficiency and security; as you know ZIPPER has stuck fairly close to the two-man team concept. We do not, however, regard this as a particularly critical question in the KIBITZ program, largely because this program is considered a short-range proposition. It is believed here, however, that the larger the individual team, the more chances there are that the team may be liquidated following the advent of hostilities. Since the agent is also worrying about his security and chances for maximum stayability under hostile conditions, this factor becomes an important one. Also, despite the fact that we envisage the KIBITZ program as short-range, we are nonetheless interested in having the teams report operational data as long as possible following war-time conditions.

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